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ABSTRACT
Aims and objectives: In this study, the feasibility and
reliability of the Prevention Recovery Information System
for Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA)-Medical method for
systematic, specialty-based analysis and classification of
incidents in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) were
determined.
Methods: After the introduction of a Neonatology
System for Analysis and Feedback on Medical Events
(NEOSAFE) in eight tertiary care NICUs and one paediatric
surgical ICU, PRISMA-Medical was started to be used to
identify root causes of voluntary reported incidents by
multidisciplinary unit patient safety committees.
Committee members were PRISMA-trained and familiar
with the department and its processes. In this study, the
results of PRISMA-analysis of incidents reported during
the first year are described. At t = 3 months and
t = 12 months after introduction, test cases were
performed to measure agreement at three levels of root
cause classification using PRISMA-Medical. Inter-rater
reliability was determined by calculating generalised k
values for each level of classification.
Results: During the study period, 981 out of 1786 eligible
incidents (55%) were analysed for underlying root causes.
In total, 2313 root causes were identified and classified,
giving an average of 2.4 root causes for every incident.
Although substantial agreement (k 0.70–0.81) was
reached at the main level of root cause classification of
the test cases (discrimination between technical,
organisational and human failure) and agreement among
the committees at the second level (discrimination
between skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based
errors) was acceptable (k 0.53–0.59), discrimination
between rule-based errors (the third level of classification)
was more difficult to assess (k 0.40–0.47).
Conclusion: With some restraints, PRISMA-Medical
proves to be both feasible and acceptably reliable to
identify and classify multiple causes of medical events in
the NICU.
In the industrial sector, it has been acknowledged
that human errors occur and that therefore
systems should be designed in such a way that
errors are prevented or detected before they
develop into a true accident.1 2 In clinical practice,
there is increasing interest in the development of
such systems, since several large studies have
confirmed the frequent occurrence of errors in
medicine resulting in (possible) patient harm.3–6 In
2005, a Neonatology System for Analysis and
Feedback on medical Events (NEOSAFE) was
introduced in The Netherlands to establish speci-
alty-based learning from incidents. Specialty-based
reporting systems can be used to collect incidents
on a grand scale, to conduct benchmarking and to
identify areas for specialty-based improvement.7–11
On the other hand, specialty-based systems also
require standardised and reliable methods for the
collection and analysis of incidents across different
units.
Little is known on the reliability of methods for
systematic incident analysis.8 12–14 This is an impor-
tant issue to address if we want to use these
methods as a diagnostic technique to expose
specialty-based system weaknesses.15 The objective
of this study was to examine the feasibility and
reliability of the PRISMA-Medical method for
systematic, specialty-based analysis and classifica-
tion of incidents in the NICU.
METHODS
PRISMA-Medical
Prevention Recovery Information System for
Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA) was originally
developed to manage human error in the chemical
process industry, but in the last decade, it was also
applied in the transportation sector, as well as in
healthcare (PRISMA-Medical).8 12 13 16 17 The main
goal of PRISMA is to build a quantitative database
of incidents (including near misses) and process
deviations, in order to facilitate the development
and evaluation of system-based preventive strate-
gies. Three main steps can be identified in the
PRISMA-Medical method: (1) the causal tree
incident description method; (2) classification of
root causes by the Eindhoven classification model
(ECM); and (3) formulation of structural measures
for improvement. In this study, we focus on the
first two steps.
Causal trees provide a visual interpretation of
the chain of events leading to an incident, without
hypothesising about possible causes. They present
critical activities and decisions during the develop-
ment of an incident in chronological order and
show how activities and decisions are logically
related to each other. Causal trees support the fact
that nearly all incidents have more than one cause.
By continuing to ask ‘‘why’’ of each event
(beginning with the top event), a structure of
causes and consequences arises, until the root
causes are identified at the bottom of the tree.
These root causes are subsequently classified by
linking them to one of the categories of the ECM
(online Appendix A). In some incidents, recovery
factors can also be identified. In this study, we
focus on the failure factors.
The ECM includes both active failures and
latent conditions. Active failures are mainly
represented by human error. The human section
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of the model is based on the SRK model developed by
Rasmussen, which distinguishes three levels of behaviour: (1)
skill-based behaviour; (2) rule-based behaviour; and (3) knowl-
edge-based behaviour.18 The medical version of PRISMA also
distinguishes patient-related factors. The latent conditions in
the ECM involve technical and organisational errors.1 In total,
the ECM distinguishes 20 different types of failure factors,
which have been linked to 20 classification codes (online
Appendix A). Technical and organisational factors are con-
sidered first when classifying root causes, and human failures
are considered last. This sequence helps to counteract the
tendency to start and stop analysis at the level of the end-user
and leave the technical and organisational context of an
incident unquestioned. The standardised classification of the
causes of incidents through a coding system enables the
analysis of multiple incident types or incidents from multiple
units at the same time.16 17
Implementation of NEOSAFE
From February through June 2005, NEOSAFE has been
implemented in 8 of the 10 Dutch level III NICUs (14–24 beds
per NICU) and one paediatric surgical ICU. In these units, a
total of approximately 3500 neonates are admitted each year.
Voluntary, non-punitive incident reporting was introduced to
establish specialty-based learning.9 An incident was defined as
‘‘any event which could have reduced, or did reduce the safety
margin for the patient’’.19 Before the introduction of NEOSAFE,
only severe or catastrophic NICU incidents were collected
through mandatory reporting to a central hospital committee,
without performing systematic analysis routinely.
A multidisciplinary patient safety committee, consisting of at
least one physician and three nurses, was formed in each unit.
Committee members were recruited on a voluntary basis. Unit
employees were encouraged to communicate openly after
incidents and to report incidents to the committee non-
anonymously, to enable contact if any additional information
was needed during analysis. Personnel were asked to fill in a
two-paged incident report form (containing both closed and
open items) immediately after the discovery of an incident.
Incidents were either self-reported or reported by personnel who
discovered the incident.
In December 2004, members of the committees participated
in a 2-day PRISMA-Medical course. With the introduction of
NEOSAFE, patient safety committees started using PRISMA-
Medical to identify root causes of incidents pertaining to
medication, arterial and venous lines and mechanical ventila-
tion. Based on previous literature and expert opinion, these
incident categories were thought to have the greatest influence
on patient safety in the NICU.19–21 To increase reliability of
results, each analysis was conducted by two members of the
committee, who were PRISMA-trained and familiar with the
department and its processes. Committees were encouraged to
analyse incidents within 2 weeks after reporting. Due to the
organisational structure in the NICU, the composition of these
couples was subject to continuous changes. The patient safety
committees managed an electronic database (MS Access) of
reported incidents and results of subsequent PRISMA analysis.
Patient and staff confidentiality was ensured by excluding
personal identification from the electronic database. To
stimulate incident reporting and safety awareness, the commit-
tees provided all NICU employees with a summary of incident
reports and planned preventive actions on a regular basis. From
July 2005 (t = 0), incident reports have been aggregated for
specialty-based analysis. The local medical research ethics
committee (METC Zwolle) waived the need for ethical
approval, as the study only involved the registration of incidents
and their causes. The present study describes the results of the
PRISMA analysis of incidents reported between 1 July 2005 and
30 June 2006.
Reliability testing
In a pilot study in September 2005 (test 1, t = 3 months), the
committees applied ECM classification codes to a total of nine
root causes in predefined causal trees, sent by email by the
central investigator (CS). The predefined causal trees were
constructed by an expert couple (authors CS and TvdS) and
were based on randomly selected incidents reported to one of
the NICUs (one from each incident category). In November
2005 (t = 5 months), a PRISMA-Medical refresher course and
consensus meeting was held to evaluate implementation of
PRISMA-Medical. As a result of this evaluation, the ECM was
further illustrated with examples specific to the NICU (‘‘ECM-
NICU’’).
At the next NEOSAFE evaluation meeting in June 2006 (test
2, t = 12 months), ECM classifications were performed on new
test cases. The test cases consisted of two sets of 45 root causes
(15 root causes from each incident category) randomly selected
from 1240 root causes identified in the central NEOSAFE
database during the first 6 months. Analyst couples were
formed within each committee. Couples were divided into
group A and group B. Using the ECM-NICU, each couple in
group A classified the first set of 45 root causes and each couple
in group B classified the second set, while an expert couple
(authors CS and TvdS) classified all causes.
In both tests, pairwise agreement for each rater couple versus
the expert and agreement among all raters was measured at the
three levels of ECM classification (online Appendix A). Inter-
rater reliability was determined by calculating generalised k
values for each level of ECM classification.22 23 We used a macro
in SPSS V.12.0.1 for Windows to define the number of cases and
number of raters. The classification by Landis and Koch was
used for interpretation of k values (k,0.00 = poor; 0.00–
0.20 = slight; 0.21–0.40 = fair; 0.41–0.60 = moderate; 0.61–
0.80 = substantial; 0.81–1.00 = (almost) perfect).24
RESULTS
For organisational reasons, one committee did not supply
PRISMA results during the study period and was therefore
excluded from further analysis. Several of the remaining eight
units reported shortage of time in handling the large number of
incidents reported after the introduction of the voluntary
reporting system. Therefore, units expecting time-management
problems were instructed to analyse every third report to get a
representative sample of PRISMA analyses. During the study
period, 981 out of 1786 eligible incidents (55%) were analysed
for underlying root causes. In total, 2313 root causes were
identified and classified, giving an average of 2.4 root causes for
every incident. Table 1 shows the results of PRISMA analysis
for each incident category.
On average, 64% of all identified causes were classified as
human failure, almost one-third of root causes represented
technical and organisational failure (9% and 22%, respectively),
and another 3% were patient-related factors. Most technical
failures were found among incidents with mechanical ventila-
tion, whereas the causes of incidents with medication were
most often classified as human failure (fig 1). As can be seen
from fig 2, verification failures were most often found in this
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incident category, followed by failures in monitoring and
intervention. Besides human failures, a peak in protocol failures
was found among incidents with IV lines (over 10% of all
identified causes), and another 8% of causes of incidents with IV
lines were classified as patient-related factors. Among incidents
with mechanical ventilation, 9% of the causes were classified as
technical failures that were beyond the control and responsi-
bility of the unit.
In test 1, seven out of eight committees were able to return
the results of test cases in time (table 2). Multirater agreement
Table 1 Results of PRISMA analysis for each incident category*
Incident category
Medication
Mechanical
ventilation IV lines Total
n % n % n % N %
Number of
analysed incidents
2005 352/619 (57) 79/193 (41) 59/119 (50) 490/931 (53)
2006 332/543 (61) 108/211 (51) 51/101 (50) 491/855 (57)
Total 684/1162 (59) 187/404 (46) 110/220 (50) 981/1786 (55)
Number of root
causes/incident{
2005 2.5 (870/352) 2.7 (210/79) 2.7 (160/59) 2.5 (1240/490)
2006 2.1 (698/332) 2.4 (259/108) 2.3 (116/51) 2.2 (1073/491)
Total 2.3 (1568/684) 2.5 (469/187) 2.5 (276/110) 2.4 (2313/981)
*As identified in the central NEOSAFE database (July 2005–June 2006).
{As identified through the causal tree incident description method.
Figure 1 Distribution of root causes
(main level) for each incident category
(July 2005–June 2006).
Figure 2 PRISMA profile of root causes
(sublevel) identified in each incident
category (July 05–June 06). *See online
Appendix A for an explanation of the ECM
codes.
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was moderate at the sublevel and SRK level and substantial at
the main level of ECM classification (table 3).
In test 2, 20 members from seven patient safety committees
participated in the test. One committee was unable to join the
NEOSAFE meeting and therefore did not participate in this test.
Each group of test cases was performed by five pairs of raters. In
both groups A and B, although the extent of agreement between
each couple and the expert varied, substantial agreement was
reached among all analyst couples at the main level of
classification, whereas the SRK level showed moderate agreement.
At the sublevel of classification, moderate agreement was reached
among analyst couples in group A. In group B, however,
agreement at this level was fair (table 4).
DISCUSSION
Our results show that the PRISMA-Medical method has a great
potential to contribute to the identification of system failures
that lead to incidents in the NICU. As both active failures (human
failure) and latent conditions (technical and organisational
Table 2 Eindhoven classification model in test 1
Test cases
ECM classification codes{
Expert Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 Rater 4 Rater 5 Rater 6 Rater 7
Accidental cutting of a central venous line
1. Rules for fixation are unclear OP OP OP OP OP OP OP OP
2. Inexperienced nurse HKK HRQ HKK HRQ HRQ HRQ HKK HKK
3. Nurse inattention HRM HRV HSS HRM HRM HRI HRM HRM
Wrong connection of ventilation tubes
4. Checks were done incorrectly HRI HRI HRV HRI HRI HRI OP HRI
5. Design of machine makes exchange of inspiration
and expiration tubes possible
TD TC TD TD TD TD TD TD
6. Colleague did not check equipment HRV OP HRC OC – HRV OC HRV
Medication overdose
7. Protocol is confusing (Strength used in protocol
differs from ampoule strength)
OP OP OP OP – OP HRV OP
8. Inexperienced nurse HKK HRQ HKK HRV HRQ HKK HKK HKK
9. Colleague did not check dose HRV OC HRV HRC HRI HRC OC HRI
{Codes relate to different aspects of technical, organisational, or human failure (see online Appendix A).
Table 3 Inter-rater reliability of ECM classification in test 1
Level of ECM
classification* Raters (patient safety committees) No. of raters
Agreement in cases
(n = 9){ (%
agreement) k{
Main level 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 7 5/7 (71) 0.81
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 and expert 8 5/7 (71) 0.79
1 and expert 2 7/9 (78) 0.61
2 and expert 2 9/9 (100) 1.00
3 and expert 2 8/9 (89) 0.79
4 and expert 2 7/7 (100) 1.00
5 and expert 2 9/9 (100) 1.00
6 and expert 2 5/9 (56) 0.22
7 and expert 2 9/9 (100) 1.00
SRK level 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 7 1/7 (14) 0.53
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 and expert 8 1/7 (14) 0.49
1 and expert 2 4/9 (44) 0.21
2 and expert 2 8/9 (89) 0.85
3 and expert 2 6/9 (67) 0.50
4 and expert 2 5/7 (71) 0.53
5 and expert 2 8/9 (89) 0.83
6 and expert 2 5/9 (56) 0.42
7 and expert 2 9/9 (100) 1.00
Sublevel 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 7 1/7 (14) 0.47
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6 and 7 and expert 8 1/7 (14) 0.41
1 and expert 2 3/9 (33) 0.21
2 and expert 2 6/9 (67) 0.60
3 and expert 2 5/9 (56) 0.49
4 and expert 2 4/7 (57) 0.49
5 and expert 2 6/9 (67) 0.61
6 and expert 2 5/9 (56) 0.47
7 and expert 2 8/9 (89) 0.86
*See online Appendix A for classification codes in each level.
{Cases with missing values were excluded from generation of sums of agreement.
{Classification by Landis and Koch.
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failures) that caused the incident were discovered, the total profile
of root causes identified through PRISMA analysis can be used to
provide a more realistic view of how the system is actually
working. The variation in causal coding between incident
categories suggests that different approaches are needed for each
incident category to prevent recurrence. However, our practical
experience shows that feasibility of PRISMA-Medical for speci-
alty-based analysis strongly depends on the availability of time
and PRISMA-trained personnel. A possible solution to this
problem is the selection and prioritisation of certain incident
types, such as high-risk incidents, for PRISMA analysis.7
Moreover, in the early stages of incident reporting, caution is
needed when interpreting results of PRISMA analysis for the
development of specialty-based preventive strategies, as inter-
rater reliability tests pointed out that agreement among patient
safety committees depends on the level of classification. Although
substantial agreement was reached at the main level of ECM
classification, and agreement among the committees within the
SRK level was acceptable, discrimination between rule-based
errors (qualification, coordination, verification, intervention and
monitoring) was more difficult to assess. Given the fact that some
rater couples scored better than others (table 3: raters 2, 5 and 7),
agreement probably also depends on other factors such as level of
training or time working in the unit.
Our study is the first extensive, multi-centred reliability
study that is based on both major and minor incidents. Few
other studies have investigated reliability of PRISMA-Medical. A
study among three healthcare inspectors and a PRISMA expert
in The Netherlands found acceptable reliability scores at all
levels of ECM classification, with increased reliability after
repeated education (M. Habraken, 2005: Better care for
incidents in healthcare, MSc thesis, Eindhoven Univ of
Technology). However, this study was based only on severe,
mostly fatal medication incidents, which is quite different from
our study design.25
The value of PRISMA-Medical for specialty-based incident
analysis has been described previously. A US study in transfusion
medicine reported that PRISMA-Medical is a very useful tool in
sense making of individual and specialty-based, aggregate causal
data.7 12 17 The percentage of human causes in our study (64%)
was rather high compared with their study (46%) and compared
with a study on incidents reported to The Netherlands Health
Care Inspectorate (42%).17 25 Although this may reflect the actual
situation in the NICU, it may also be due to remaining ‘‘person-
oriented’’ biases during the root cause analysis. If the latter is the
case, one should expect to observe a decrease in the percentage of
human failures after repeated education. Moreover, although
several causes were identified for each incident, we did not test
inter-rater reliability of the Causal tree description method.
Therefore, future research should develop methods to test the
reliability of the causal tree description method as well. A pilot
study has already shown the importance of this issue.26
This study has some limitations. First, only 55% of all eligible
reported incidents were analysed. Although our sample size is
quite high, and we tried to minimise selection bias by analysing
every third report in case of time-management problems, this
may have affected the final profile of root causes. Second, valid
comparisons between the first and second reliability test were
difficult to assess because of natural selection of analyst couples,
as a reflection of the clinical setting. Third, the 2-day PRISMA
course was a shortened version of the original 3-day course. This
may have affected the reliability of classification negatively,
especially during the time before the PRISMA refresher course
(table 3).
In conclusion, with some restraints, PRISMA-Medical proves
to be both feasible and acceptably reliable for specialty-based
identification and classification of multiple causes of incidents
in the NICU. The system approach states that preventive
actions should primarily aim at the structural (latent) system
failures to prevent inevitable human failures, which are usually
Table 4 Inter-rater reliability of ECM classification in test 2
Level of ECM
classification * Raters (couples) No. of raters
Group A Group B
Agreement in cases
(n = 45){ (% agreement) k{
Agreement in cases
(n = 45){ (% agreement) k{
Main level 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 5 18/26 (69) 0.74 18/26 (69) 0.70
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and expert 6 18/26 (69) 0.77 18/26 (69) 0.74
1 and expert 2 36/40 (90) 0.83 34/36 (94) 0.87
2 and expert 2 32/39 (82) 0.70 35/42 (83) 0.66
3 and expert 2 33/37 (89) 0.84 34/45 (76) 0.52
4 and expert 2 38/41 (93) 0.88 34/43 (79) 0.60
5 and expert 2 30/35 (86) 0.78 32/36 (89) 0.77
SRK level 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 5 12/26 (46) 0.58 13/26 (50) 0.59
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and expert 6 12/26 (46) 0.60 13/26 (50) 0.61
1 and expert 2 26/40 (65) 0.54 30/36 (83) 0.73
2 and expert 2 23/39 (59) 0.47 38/42 (90) 0.52
3 and expert 2 26/37 (70) 0.65 29/45 (64) 0.50
4 and expert 2 29/41 (71) 0.61 27/43 (63) 0.47
5 and expert 2 24/35 (69) 0.60 28/36 (78) 0.64
Sublevel 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 5 6/26 (23) 0.44 4/26 (15) 0.40
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and expert 6 6/26 (23) 0.48 4/26 (15) 0.45
1 and expert 2 24/40 (60) 0.56 20/36 (56) 0.50
2 and expert 2 21/39 (54) 0.49 25/42 (60) 0.55
3 and expert 2 19/37 (51) 0.47 21/45 (47) 0.40
4 and expert 2 23/41 (56) 0.51 24/43 (56) 0.49
5 and expert 2 21/35 (60) 0.56 19/36 (53) 0.46
*See online Appendix A for classification codes in each level.
{Cases with missing values were excluded from generation of sums of agreement.
{Classification by Landis and Koch.
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at the end of the incident cascade, leading to patient injury.1 In
this light, preventive strategies in the NICU should be aimed at
the technical and organisational weaknesses first, rather than at
human failure. Future research should study the predictive
validity of PRISMA by investigating the effect of system-based
interventions on the prevalence of these system failures, as well
as on patient harm. Moreover, future studies should also
examine the role of the PRISMA Error Recovery Factors in the
prevention of incidents.
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APPENDIX A
Eindhoven classification model—medical version
Level of ECM classification
Category DefinitionMain level (n = 5)
SRK level
(n = 15) Sublevel (n = 20)
Technical T-EX T-EX External Technical failures beyond the control and responsibility of the investigating
organisation
TD TD Design Failures due to poor design of equipment, software, labels or forms
TC TC Construction Correct design, which was not constructed properly or was set up in inaccessible
areas
TM TM Materials Material defects not classified under TD or TC
Organisational O-EX O-EX External Failures at an organisational level beyond the control and responsibility of the
investigating organisation, such as in another department or area (address by
collaborative systems)
OK OK Transfer of knowledge Failures resulting from inadequate measures taken to ensure that situational or
domain-specific knowledge or information is transferred to all new or inexperienced
staff
OP OP Protocols Failures relating to the quality and availability of the protocols within the department
(too complicated, inaccurate, unrealistic, absent or poorly presented)
OM OM Management priorities Internal management decisions in which safety is relegated to an inferior position
when faced with conflicting demands or objectives. This is a conflict between
production needs and safety. An example of this category is decisions that are made
about staffing levels
OC OC Culture Failures resulting from collective approach and its attendant modes of behaviour to
risks in the investigating organisation
Human H-EX H-EX External Human failures originating beyond the control and responsibility of the investigating
organisation. This could apply to individuals in another department
HK: knowledge-
based behaviour
HKK Knowledge-based
behaviour
The inability of an individual to apply their existing knowledge to a novel situation.
Example: a trained blood bank technologist who is unable to solve a complex antibody
identification problem
HR: rule-based
behaviour
HRQ Qualifications The incorrect fit between an individuals training or education and a particular task.
Example: expecting a technician to solve the same type of difficult problems as a
technologist
HRC Coordination A lack of task coordination within a health care team in an organisation. Example: an
essential task not being performed because everyone thought that someone else had
completed the task
HRV Verification The correct and complete assessment of a situation including related conditions of the
patient and materials to be used before starting the intervention. Example: failure to
correctly identify a patient by checking the wristband
HRI Intervention Failures that result from faulty task planning and execution. Example: washing red cells
by the same protocol as platelets
HRM Monitoring Monitoring a process or patient status. Example: a trained technologist operating an
automated instrument and not realising that a pipette that dispenses reagents is
clogged
HS: skill-based
behaviour
HSS Slips Failures in performance of highly developed skills. Example: a technologist adding
drops of reagents to a row of test tubes and then missing the tube or a computer entry
error
HST Tripping Failures in whole body movements. These errors are often referred to as ‘‘slipping,
tripping, or falling’’. Examples: a blood bag slipping out of one’s hands and breaking or
tripping over a loose tile on the floor
Patient-related PRF PRF Patient-related factor Failures related to patient characteristics or conditions, which are beyond the control
of staff and influence treatment
Unclassifiable X X Unclassifiable Failures that cannot be classified in any other category
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Corrections
White RE, Trbovich PL, Easty AC, et al. Checking it twice: an evaluation of
checklists for detecting medication errors at the bedside using a chemotherapy
model. Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19:562e7.
There are two errors in the results section of this article. The authors state that
“the new checklist helped nurses to detect more errors of any type (55%; 71/130)
than the old checklist (38%; 49/130)”. These fractions should not have been
included because they are not a logical statistic to report. There were different
numbers of planted errors in each category, making the sum of total errors
unbalanced: error types which happened to have more planted errors get more
weight in the fraction than those with fewer errors. The percentages reported are
accurate because the authors took the average error detection percentage across
each of the four types- giving them equal weight.
The authors also state that 51/60 errors in pump programming were detected
with the old checklist, when it should read 54/60. The percentage value reported
was correct (90%).
BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20:396. doi:10.1136/qshc.2009.032862corr1
Snijders C, van der Schaaf T W, Klip H, et al. Feasibility and reliability of PRISMA-
Medical for specialty-based incident analysis. Qual Saf Health Care 2009;18:486e91.
The authors names were incorrectly cited in this paper. The author list should
have been as follows; C Snijders, T W van der Schaaf, H Klip, R A van Lingen, W P F
Fetter, A Molendijk.
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